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 MARTIN LIEBSCHER 
 The title Nietzsche and Ethics subsumes a collection of various articles from a conference held in 
September 2004, under the auspices of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, U.K. This open, almost 
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vague formulation of the topic reflects the following difficulty: that one cannot ascertain with 
certainty what constitutes Nietzsche’s ethics or indeed whether one can speak of moral thinking in 
Nietzsche at all. It is, however, this nexus between Nietzsche and ethics that opens up a space for a 
diversity of contributions ranging from either the affirmation or the rejection of Nietzsche’s dismissal 
of moral values to attempts at delineating a new ethics from his writings. This is confirmed by the 
editor’s introduction, which observes that scholars, despite their agreement on the importance of 
Nietzsche’s thinking for moral philosophy, tend to diverge in their conclusions about Nietzsche’s 
relation to ethics (7). 
 The different philosophical and methodological approaches of each  contributor add to this confus-
ing variety of views, and the reader should not necessarily expect to come closer to a final verdict 
on the merits of Nietzsche’s ethical considerations. Yet at the same time, the impossibility of pin-
ning Nietzsche’s philosophy down to its “true” moral content is itself inherent in his perspectivism, 
which has been both the curse and the fortune of Nietzsche scholarship. According to Nietzsche, 
truth and moral truth are related to the constant shifting of perspectives in relation to changing 
constellations of power. 
 While some articles in this volume seem to ignore the perspectival character of truth in Nietzsche 
altogether, embarking on a search for the esoteric contents of his moral philosophy, the approach 
of Robert Guay provides a welcome contrast insofar as it gives credit to Nietzsche’s ever-shifting 
perspectives. Guay engages with Nietzsche’s claim to be an immoralist and interprets his critique of 
morality as a necessary corrective: “Any approach that offers definitive answers or that relies on the 
fixity of character to provide stability harms its own provision of practical guidance” (73). By reject-
ing morality, immoralism questions the dogmatic character of hitherto fixed ethical systems. What 
remains is “human flourishing” ( GM P:3), a teleology without any particular telos—an everlasting 
play of will-to-power quanta. This means—according to Guay—that Nietzsche’s immoralism leads 
back to the fundaments of human nature and the human need to find a purpose for existence: “So we 
need teachers of the purpose of existence to make sense of life, and we need to be able to live up to 
our sense-making in order to sustain our purposiveness” (77). This circle, in which life is giving itself 
a purpose for the sake of doing so, is constantly shifting, and thus Guay’s interpretation seems to be in 
accordance with Nietzsche’s understanding of perspectivism and the will to power. 
 It follows from this perspectival reading that Guay disagrees with Edward Harcourt’s approach to 
interpreting Nietzsche’s ethics along the lines of eudaemonism. Harcourt places Nietzsche’s reflec-
tions between the neo-Aristotelian and the immoralist positions. Similarly to Guay, he understands 
Nietzsche’s concept of “human flourishing” from the preface of  GM as central for his ethics but 
defines this as a eudaemonistic position. This comes at the price of excluding inner harmony from 
the essential realm of eudaemonism. 
 In their attempt to get hold of Nietzsche’s ethics, both contributions place an emphasis on those 
texts by Nietzsche that seem to affirm their arguments, thereby neglecting others and ignoring 
the development and changes in Nietzsche’s  thinking. Whereas Guay could argue that there are 
perspectival changes, Harcourt falls into the trap of finding a fixed ethical position in Nietzsche 
and of  applying this assumption to contradictory arguments in Nietzsche’s work. To avoid this 
difficulty, one must either follow Karl Jaspers by deliberately looking for those contradictions in 
Nietzsche that suit one’s interpretation or choose a philological approach that investigates thoroughly 
the development of Nietzsche’s  thinking on ethics. This is one of the reasons why the edition of 
the  KGW and the  quellenkundliche contributions in its commentary and in  Nietzsche-Studien have 
been so important. 
 Thomas Brobjer belongs to this tradition of Nietzsche scholarship and has contributed numerous 
amendments to our knowledge of Nietzsche’s sources. His article in this volume shows the devel-
opment of Nietzsche’s moral thinking and his engagement with different ethical systems. To deal 
with Nietzsche and ethics requires knowledge of this development—Nietzsche’s religious youth; 
his belief in a new spirituality by awakening the Greek tragic culture in  BT ; the engagement with 
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positions such as utilitarianism, amoralism, and immoralism. As some contributions to this volume 
do not differentiate between the periods in which various texts by Nietzsche were written, it is nec-
essary for any reader to have a close look at Brobjer’s article first. Unfortunately, his contribution 
does not—as one would expect—open the volume but, rather, closes it. (The introduction does not 
clarify the chosen order of the articles.) 
 The volume begins with a contribution by Ken Gemes, focusing heavily on  GM . This is unfortunate 
as (together with the aforementioned texts by Guay and Harcourt) it shifts the emphasis of Nietzsche’s 
considerations of ethics to this  Streitschrift or polemic and gives the impression that Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on moral philosophy are restricted to it. Here we have to remember that Nietzsche described 
 GM as a commentary on  BGE and both of these texts as, in turn, a commentary on Z . Beginning 
with the preface to  GM , Gemes traces Nietzsche’s arguments on the will to truth as a “tool to repress 
and split off part of our nature,” which undermines the belief in the sovereign individual and in free 
will. It is, he argues, Nietzsche’s aim to “bring home to us the disturbing message that we splintered 
moderns are strangers to ourselves” (20). It would have been worthwhile if Gemes had put Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on the will to truth, on the scientific spirit, and on free will and genuine selfhood into the 
context of the unpublished fragments, in which Nietzsche had been occupied with some of those 
questions long before  GM . Here one can follow Nietzsche’s thoughts on the origins of morality and 
on how the will to truth developed from it, only to turn against itself at the very end of this process. 
In an unpublished fragment from autumn 1881 Nietzsche states that the suicide of morality is its 
own last moral demand (“der Selbstmord der Moral ist ihre eigene letzte moralische Forderung” 
[Nachgelassene Fragmente Frühjahr 1881 bis Sommer 1882,  KSA  9.640]). 
 It has to be pointed out that the focus on Nietzsche’s published writings and a neglect of the 
 Nachlass constitute a prevailing tendency in anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, as there is still 
no complete translation of the unpublished  writings available. We are also reminded of the fact 
that even good translations do not  necessarily further understanding when we read the article of 
Gudrun von Tevenar on  Mitleid . For the English reader,  Mitleid could be rendered as either “pity” 
or “compassion.” Using this differentiation, Tevenar attempts to develop a new understanding of 
Nietzsche’s rejection of Mitleid as, according to her hypothesis, his concern was mainly to focus on 
“compassion” as  weakening life. This  methodological approach seems to me highly problematic, as 
it  suggests a differentiation that Nietzsche could not have had in mind as a German writer. Instead 
of trying to understand Nietzsche’s thinking, this approach adapts his philosophy to the English-
speaking mind. (This Anglo-Saxon emphasis of the volume is also affirmed by the fact that most 
contributors do not cite the German original quotes in the footnotes.) Rebecca Bamford’s article 
also deals with Nietzsche’s rejection of Mitleid. Focusing on Zarathustra’s encounter with the ugli-
est man in part 4 of  Z , she defends Nietzsche’s critique by pointing out that virtue still prevails in 
Zarathustra’s attitude: “Zarathustra’s benevolence, his capacity for honesty, and most particularly 
his capacity for shame, allow us to admire him as a virtuous character” (266). 
 Whereas most of the contributors draw their attention to the late immoralist writings of Nietzsche, 
in particular GM , Herman Siemens uses the late concept of  Umwertung aller Werte as a tool for inter-
preting  BT . According to Siemens,  BT is Nietzsche’s first attempt at a transvaluation of values. The 
affirmation of life is opposed to the Socratic culture of Western society. Siemens highlights the prob-
lem of this approach, as Nietzsche’s claim will always remain contradictory as long as his overcoming 
of Socratic values remains at the level of discourse. That is why Nietzsche’s discursive challenge has 
to be supplemented by a  performative one that is, according to Siemens, the Greek concept of  agon : 
“In short, Nietzsche’s text  is itself  agonal culture, as the affirmative interpretation of life thematized 
throughout his work as the highest from of life: (the rebirth of) tragic culture” (173). 
 Robin Small investigates Nietzsche’s understanding of evolution in the  context of today’s 
 evolutionary ethics. Nietzsche’s critique of altruism is based on his rejection of an approach that 
 identifies the good with the well-being of the species. The concept of the will to life—which 
Nietzsche attributes falsely to Darwin—is replaced by the will to power. In this way, Nietzsche 
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is able to  formulate an evolutionary concept that emphasizes individuals and not species. Small 
describes this development in Nietzsche’s thought from the time of his friendship with Paul Rée 
up until the late writings. 
 Small’s interest in Nietzsche’s contribution to modern theories of evolution is accompanied 
by another article on the reception of Nietzsche’s ethical thinking. Carol Diethe examines how 
Nietzsche’s sexual ethics was received by the different circles in the first wave of Nietzsche reception. 
Her survey ranges from the so-called  Kosmiker to the male projection of the “femme fatale,” from 
Otto Weininger to Magnus Hirschfeld. In her informative overview she puts a special emphasis on 
the reception of Nietzsche among the early members of the feminist movement, especially Helene 
Stöcker. As Diethe shows, Stöcker’s concern with the social improvement of married mothers and the 
demand for a revaluation of female sexuality were miles apart from Lou Andreas-Salomé’s concept 
of the sexual and the general fulfillment of female expression. 
 “Toward a Will to Power Sociology” is the title of Henry Staten’s  contribution to the volume. Here 
he looks at Nietzsche’s understanding of consciousness as determined by the instincts and drives. 
Arguing against such a biological determinism, Staten claims a semiautonomous status for conscious-
ness, where the “I” is not solely a plaything of the unconscious will to power and the struggles of the 
body but partially also the result of determining processes developed through cultural and sociologi-
cal forms. This becomes evident in the concept of  techné , where the know-how of socially acquired 
skills intermingles with the drives and instincts of the body, thereby blurring the boundaries between 
consciousness and unconsciousness. According to Staten, this opening of the social makes possible a 
productive new engagement between the notion of the will to power and ethical theory (164). 
 James Wilson’s article, “Nietzsche and Equality,” is rather polemical in nature. A thorough 
examination of Nietzsche’s thought is overshadowed by a personal value system that forms the 
basis of his engagement with Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. Wilson states that “despite Nietzsche’s 
undoubted interest and  brilliance as an ethical thinker, at the deepest level, we must think of him 
as an opponent” (222). His attempt to replace the theory of the will to power and the pathos of dis-
tance with an ethical concept of equality could certainly be seen as an argument in favor of will to 
power. It is an interpretation that tries to overcome the other by means of power. Although he deals 
with Nietzsche as an opponent, the author assures us that he views Nietzsche’s arguments against 
egalitarianism from a perspective that is friendly to Nietzsche. One wonders whether this kind of 
value judgment helps us to understand Nietzsche’s ethical position at all. But the engagement with 
Nietzsche’s concepts of morality from a philological and hermeneutical point of view—something 
that is necessary to understand Nietzsche’s statements in the context of his time and to protect oneself 
from any emotional Nietzschean or anti-Nietzschean outbursts—is not what James Wilson seems 
to favor: “Treating the interpretation of Nietzsche’s text as a purely scholarly endeavor without any 
implications for what we  ought to think about morality diminishes both Nietzsche and ourselves. 
It diminishes Nietzsche, because it treats him merely as a figure in the history of ideas, rather than 
someone who is making serious claims about how we should live” (229). It is, however, precisely 
a hermeneutical-scholarly approach that would produce very important implications for our moral 
conduct, preventing us first from adhering uncritically to Nietzschean ethics and its problematic 
implications and second from making polemical egalitarian statements that do not want to engage 
with Nietzsche’s thinking at all. 
 As is always the case with the publication of conference proceedings, the quality of the essays 
varies, and the range of topics is widespread. But for all of those who are interested in recent debates 
in moral philosophy and the role of Nietzsche’s philosophy in these debates, this volume provides 
a welcome opportunity to gain an overview. 
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